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AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPOUSES




The Wisconsin Marital Property Act1 (the Act), and the
Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA)2 upon which it is
based, are remarkable for the scope and detail of their provi-
sions regarding agreements between spouses. Present law in
Wisconsin and in the eight community property states3 does
not contain the broad and explicit authorization to spouses to
regulate their relationship that is given to them by the Act and
by UMPA.4
This Article will analyze the provisions of the Wisconsin
Act concerning agreements between spouses. The provisions
of the Act which govern agreements between spouses' will fall
into four categories: (1) matters which may be the subject of
an enforceable agreement; (2) matters which may not be the
subject of an enforceable agreement; (3) formal requirements
for an agreement (including the requirements for its revoca-
tion); and (4) requirements that can be conveniently (if some-
what inaccurately) grouped under a rubric of "fairness"-
conscionability, voluntariness, and disclosure.6
* B.S., Stanford University, 1973; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1976; Assistant Pro-
fessor, Marquette University Law School.
1. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. ch. 766). It is sometimes
referred to as the Marital Property Reform Act.
2. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT, 9A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
UMPA].
3. The eight community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.
4. The comment to UMPA section 3 states: "The act permits a couple to move its
marital economics from status to contract and encourages a type of interspousal con-
tractual freedom little known in common law states."
5. The Act uses the term "marital property agreement." See 1983 Wis. Laws 186,
§ 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 766.01(12), 766.58(1)).
6. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58). Two miscellaneous provisions
not falling under any one of the four categories stated in the text are mentioned here for
completeness. First, the Wisconsin Act contains a provision, not present in the UMPA,
that authorizes the spouses to submit to binding arbitration "any controversies arising
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This Article will discuss each of these categories. The fi-
nal section of the Article will examine the relationship be-
tween the part of the Act which concerns marital agreements
and the provisions of other law.
II. THE PERMISSIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
The broad power to make an agreement is conferred by
future section 766.17: "Variation by marital property agree-
ment. Except as provided. . . a marital property agreement
may vary the effect of this chapter."' 7 However, the section
which governs spousal agreements in the greatest detail is fu-
ture section 766.58.8 Specifically, subsection three lists several
matters about which spouses can make an enforceable agree-
ment. 9 In giving spouses the power to make an agreement
concerning "[r]ights in and obligations with respect to any of
either or both spouses' property whenever and wherever ac-
quired or located,"'1 the section specifically authorizes them
under this chapter or a marital property agreement." Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 766.58(10)). Second, the Act states that previous law applies to agreements signed
before the Act's effective date unless the spouses provide otherwise in a marital property
agreement. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(12)).
7. Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.17). The four sections excepted from the
rule are discussed infra at notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
8. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58).
9. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(3)) provides:
Except as provided in §§ 766.15, 766.55(4m) and 766.57(3), and in sub. (2),
in a marital property agreement spouses may agree with respect to any of the
following:
(a) Rights in and obligations with respect to any of either or both spouses'
property whenever and wherever acquired or located.
(b) Management and control of any of either or both spouses' property.
(c) Disposition of any or either of both spouses' property upon dissolution or
death or upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event.
(d) Modification or elimination of spousal support, except as provided in
sub. (9).
(e) Making a will, trust or other arrangement to carry out the marital prop-
erty agreement.
(f) Providing that upon the death of either spouse any of either or both
spouses' property, including after-acquired property, passes without probate to a
designated person, trust or other entity by nontestamentary disposition.
(g) Choice of law governing construction of the marital property agreement.
(h) Any other matter affecting either or both spouses' property not in viola-
tion of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.
10. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(3)(a)). Addi-
tionally, "[s]pouses may reclassify their property by... marital property agreement."
Id (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(10)).
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to reclassify their property from marital to individual, or vice-
versa, including property to be acquired in the future."
III. THE PROHIBITED SUBJECT MATTER
A number of other provisions in the Act list those matters
which may not be the subject of an enforceable agreement.
Four subsections are listed as exceptions to the general rule
that spouses can make enforceable agreements which vary the
effect of the Act. First, a spouse's obligation of good faith
with respect to the other spouse may not be varied by a mari-
tal property agreement.1 2 Second, no provision of a marital
property agreement may adversely affect the interest of a cred-
itor unless the creditor had knowledge of the provision. 13
Third, the provision which protects bona fide purchasers of
marital property from a spouse who has management and
control of the property may not be varied by a marital prop-
erty agreement.1 4 And fourth, an agreement may not ad-
versely affect the right of a child to support. 15
Two additional restrictions limit the spouses' power to
make an agreement modifying spousal support during mar-
riage or after the dissolution of marriage.1 6 This provision is
contrary to the 1978 Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision in
Whitwam v. Whitwam. 17 In that case, the judgment of di-
vorce, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, provided in part
that alimony would be payable if and when public assistance
was received in the future by the dependent spouse. That por-
tion of the judgment was declared invalid by the court of ap-
11. It is questionable whether it was necessary to list the matters with respect to
which spouses can agree. Some of the matters listed in subsection three are specifically
dealt with in some other section of the Act. See, eg., 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be
codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.51). An agreement concerning those matters would "vary
the effect of this chapter" and is, therefore, already authorized by future section 766.17.
As for the matters listed in subsection three that are not covered by the Act, a married
person has the same power to make a contract (or will) regarding them as has any other
person, as long as the contract (or will) is not prohibited by statute or case law; specific
authorization seems unnecessary. Perhaps the drafters thought it useful to list several
of the provisions of the Act which spouses would most commonly wish to affect.
12. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.15(1)).
13. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.55(4m)).
14. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.57(3)).
15. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(2)).
16. See iL (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(9)).
17. 87 Wis. 2d 22, 272 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1978).
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peals, which stated that alimony is fixed on the basis of the
dependent spouse's needs and the other spouse's ability to pay
and that these facts are to be determined "upon the basis of
circumstances existing at the time of the divorce." 8 Pursuant
to the Act, however, a court may declare invalid an agreement
concerning maintenance on the ground that the agreement
makes a spouse eligible for public assistance "after dissolution
of the marriage." 19 The language of the Act apparently allows
a court to make such a declaration of invalidity at any time
after the dissolution. As a result, a judgment concerning
maintenance would never be final.20
The Act also provides that spouses may agree with respect
to "[a]ny other matter affecting either or both spouses' prop-
erty not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a
criminal penalty. ' 21 This phrase is unfortunate for two rea-
sons. First, the phrase is unnecessary. To the extent that the
Act does not change the present law, that law will still gov-
ern. 22 Under present law, a court may refuse to enforce a con-
tract which violates public policy or is "illegal," even in the
absence of a specific statutory provision to that effect.23 A
marital property agreement, whether supported by considera-
tion24 or not, 25 would still be subject to this common-law rule.
And second, the presence of the phrase referring to violations
of public policy or a criminal statute in one subsection and its
absence from preceding subsections imply that agreements on
matters described in the preceding paragraphs cannot be de-
clared unenforceable on the grounds of public policy or ile-
18. Id. at 27-28, 273 N.W.2d at 368.
19. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(9)(b)).
20. See Walther, The Uniform Marital Property Act Wisconsin Version, 4 EQUlTA-
BLE DiSmiBuTioN REP. 140, 143 (1983).
21. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(3)(h)).
22. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.96) which states: "Unless displaced
by this chapter, the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions." See also
LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis.2d 116, 129-30, 330 N.W.2d 555, 562 (1983).
23. Wisconsin courts have held contracts unenforceable under this doctrine. See,
eg., Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973);
Venisek v. Draski, 35 Wis.2d 38, 150 N.W.2d 347 (1967); Griffith v. Harris, 17 Wis. 2d
255, 116 N.W.2d 133 (1962).
24. Such an agreement would constitute a contract. See supra note 23.
25. The agreement need not involve consideration to be enforceable. See 1983 Wis.
Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(1)). The common-law rule has
been applied to the analogous situation of wills. See infra note 26.
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gality. Yet, an agreement on one of those matters might very
well violate public policy or a criminal statute, and there is no
reason to prevent the courts from declaring such agreements
unenforceable once the Act becomes effective.2 6
IV. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
An agreement between spouses must be signed by both
spouses.27 Although the Act does not explicitly state that an
agreement must be in writing, the signature requirement and
the statement that an agreement "shall be a document" 2 evi-
dences the legislative intent. Consideration is not a formal re-
quirement for spousal agreements.29
Although there is no requirement that a marital agreement
be recorded, the Act states that married persons or persons
intending to marry may record an agreement with the register
of deeds.30 The purpose of recording would only be for safe-
keeping of the instrument; the recording does not constitute
notice to a third party.31
A marital property agreement may be amended or revoked
only by a subsequent marital property agreement 2.3  The Act
does not contain any provision stating that an agreement is
revoked upon dissolution of the marriage by divorce, annul-
ment, or legal separation. The Act does, however, confer
upon the courts a broad authority to vary the relationship be-
26. For example, the Act authorizes spouses to agree with respect to disposition of
a spouses' property upon death. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis.
STAT. § 766.58(3)(c)). That kind of agreement would be, in effect, a type of will, and
provisions of wills have been held void in Wisconsin on the ground that they were
contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Estate of Hauck, 239 Wis. 421, 1 N.W.2d (1942);
Will of Keenan, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N.W. 1001 (1925). If the Act were read to "over-
rule" these cases, such provisions could appear in a marital property agreement but not
in a will. This anomalous result could not have been intended.
27. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(1)).
28. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(1)). See also
UMPA, supra note 2, prefatory note.
29. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(1)).
30. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(1 1)).
31. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.56(2)(a)).
32. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(4)). UMPA differs from the Wis-
consin provision by including an additional sentence: "The amended agreement or the
revocation is enforceable without consideration." UMPAsupra note 2, § 10(d). Since
the amended agreement or the revocation is itself a marital property agreement, and
since subsection (1) provides that a marital property agreement is enforceable without
consideration, the additional sentence in UMPA is redundant.
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tween spouses in a manner that would effectively abrogate the
most common provisions of a marital agreement between
them.33
Likewise, there is no provision of the Act which would
revoke an agreement at the death of a spouse. Since the agree-
ment would not then be revocable by a subsequent agreement,
it would be binding upon the survivor.34 A provision for dis-
position of the survivor's property at death35 would continue
to have meaning; it would bind the survivor in the same way
that a contract not to revoke a will binds the surviving party.36
V. REQUIREMENTS OF "FAIRNESS"
The Act contains the remaining requirements for an en-
forceable agreement between spouses;3 7 they will probably be
the ones most frequently violated. Restated in an affirmative
form, the statute sets forth the requirements for enforceability
as follows: (1) the agreement was conscionable when made;
(2) the spouse against whom enforcement is sought executed
the agreement voluntarily; and (3) this spouse received fair
33. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.75(4)).
34. Of course, provisions of such an agreement concerning management and con-
trol of a spouse's property, its classification, and many other matters would no longer
have any effect after one spouse's death.
35. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(3)(c), (f)).
36. See, eg., Estate of Phillips, 54 Wis. 2d 296, 195 N.W.2d 485 (1972); Estate of
Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970).
37. Future section 766.58(6) provides:
A marital property agreement executed before or during marriage is not en-
forceable if the spouse against whom enforcement is sought proves any of the
following:
(a) The marital property agreement was unconscionable when made.
(b) That spouse did not execute the marital property agreement voluntarily.
(c) Before execution of the marital property agreement, that spouse:
1. Did not receive fair and reasonable disclosure of the other spouse's prop-
erty or financial obligations;
2. Did not voluntarily and expressly waive in a written consent any right to
disclosure of the other spouse's property or financial obligations beyond that
actually provided, or did waive the right to disclosure of the general categories of
the other spouse's assets at the approximate fair market value less general cate-
gories of the other spouse's liabilities at approximate fair market value; and
3. Did not have notice of the other spouse's property or financial
obligations.
1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)). This provision has




and reasonable disclosure of the other spouse's property and
financial obligations, or one of the alternatives to disclosure
was satisfied.38
A. Conscionability
In a 1983 case, Discount Fabric House v. Wisconsin Tele-
phone Co. ,39 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals discussed the un-
conscionability doctrine at length. The plaintiff had
contracted with the defendant telephone company to place an
advertisement in the yellow pages. The contract provided that
the telephone company was not liable for errors or omissions
in advertising beyond the amount charged. The plaintiff's ad-
vertisement as printed contained an error, and the plaintiff
brought suit for damages due to lost profits. In finding the
provision conscionable, the court of appeals quoted from a
number of sources in attempting to give meaning to
"unconscionability."
An unconscionable contract has been defined as one
which no man in his senses, not under delusion, would
38. The statute lists two alternatives to the disclosure requirement: "notice" and
waiver of the right to disclosure. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(2),
(3)). See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disclosure
requirement and its alternatives.
UMPA differs from the Wisconsin Act in containing two different provisions deal-
ing with these requirements - one concerning agreements executed during marriage
and another for premarital agreements. See UMPA, supra note 2, § 10(f), (g).
Under the premarital provision, even an unconscionable agreement would be en-
forceable as long as there had been full disclosure. Similarly, an agreement between
nondisclosing spouses would be enforceable if it was conscionable.
During the debates on UMPA, two factors were mentioned in support of dual stan-
dards. First, it was believed desirable that UMPA and the Uniform Premarital Agree-
ments Act be consistent in their requirements for the enforceability of premarital
agreements, and the present provision accomplishes that result. See 2 PROCEEDINGS IN
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS-MARrrAL PROPERTY ACT 333 (July 23, 25 & 26, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]; UMPA, supra note 2, § 10 comment. Second, be-
cause there is more opportunity for duress during marriage, the standard for agreements
made then should be stricter. See 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 448, 458. On the
other hand, some of the commissioners objected to the premarital standard on the
ground that an agreement signed by a spouse who lacked knowledge of the other
spouse's assets would probably be unconscionable. See id.
The other major difference between UMPA § 10(f) and 1983 WIs. LAWS 186, § 47
(to be codified at WIs. STAT. § 766.58(6)) is Wisconsin's addition to the waiver
provision.
39. 113 Wis. 2d 258, 334 N.W.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1983).
[Vol. 68:404
MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
make, on the one hand, and as one which no fair and honest
man would accept, on the other. . . . [F]actors to be consid-
ered. . . include: (1) the use of printed form or 'boilerplate'
contracts drawn by the party in the strongest economic posi-
tion and offered to the weaker party on a take-it or leave-it
basis. . .; (2) exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisti-
cated, and uneducated buyer of consumer goods. . .;and (3)
the hiding of clauses disadvantageous to one party in a mass
of fine print ....
Additionally, the courts consider such factors as: (1) sig-
nificant cost-price disparity; (2) the inclusion of penalty
clauses; (3) the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the contract; (4) the phrasing of clauses in 'legalese' incom-
prehensible to a layman, and (5) an overall imbalance in the
obligations and rights imposed by the bargain.'
Under the Act, "[t]he issue of whether a marital property
agreement is unconscionable is for the court to decide as a
matter of law."'41 Although the debates on UMPA are not
entirely clear on the point, the commissioners apparently in-
tended this provision to mean only that the question of uncon-
scionability is for the judge, not the jury, to decide.
According to the commissioners, the phrase "as a matter of
law" does not require the spouse to establish a case to the
extent necessary to take the case from the jury, nor does it
prevent the court from considering all the facts and circum-
stances in reaching a decision.42
Unconscionability is to be measured as of the time when
the agreement was made.43 Without that provision, an agree-
ment that took no apparent advantage of a spouse when made
would perhaps be found unconscionable when viewed in light
of the circumstances at the time of its attempted enforcement.
The provision in the Act limits a court, in its determination of
unconscionability, to a consideration of the circumstances at
the time the agreement was made.
40. Id. at 261-63, 334 N.W.2d at 924-25 (citations omitted). See also Foursquare
Properties v. Johnny's Loaf& Stein, 116 Wis. 2d 679, 343 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comments c, d, (1981).
41. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(8)).
42. See 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 456-61.




The Wisconsin Act added to the UMPA provisions on en-
forceability the following sentence: "In the event that legal
counsel is retained in connection with a marital property
agreement the fact that each party to a marital property agree-
ment is not represented by independent counsel does not by
itself make a marital property agreement unconscionable or
otherwise affect its enforceability, if each spouse waived in-
dependent representation in writing."'
C. Voluntariness
An agreement will not be enforceable if the spouse did not
execute the agreement "voluntarily. ' 45 The term is not defined
in the Act, and the definitions found in the case law are not
helpful.46
D. Disclosure and Its Alternatives
Finally, the Act requires that one of the following have
occurred before execution of the agreement: (1) the spouse
against whom enforcement is sought "receive[d] fair and rea-
sonable disclosure.of the other spouse's property [and] 47 finan-
cial obligations; ' 48 (2) the spouse "voluntarily and expressly
waive[d] in a written consent any right to disclosure of the
other spouse's property and financial obligations beyond that
actually provided," 49 but did not make a general waiver;50or
44. See id (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(8)).
45. See id. (to be codified at'Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(b))
46. See, eg. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Hall, 233 Ala. 338, _, 135 So. 466, 471
("done by design or intentional; intentional; purposed; intended; not accidental") (citing
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 661 (1931);
R.T. Realty, Inc. v. Downes, 14 Misc. 2d 322, 324, 182 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82 (1958) ("[t]he
term, 'voluntarily,' envisions the exercise of the will-a deliberate choice between two
(or more) known courses of action").
47. The statute uses the word "or," but it is believed the correct word is "and."
The intended purpose of the provision is clearly to require disclosure of both the prop-
erty and the financial obligations. See 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 467. The diffi-
culty arises from an ambiguity in the syntax of the statute, which is phrased in the
negative.
48. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(c)(1)).
49. Id (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(c)(2)).
50. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68:404
MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
(3) the spouse had "notice of the other spouse's property
[and]5 1 financial obligations. '52
1. Fair and reasonable disclosure versus notice
The presence of both the disclosure alternative and the no-
tice alternative is puzzling. In the absence of the "fair and
reasonable" criteria which the Act attaches to disclosure, the
disclosure alternative would be unnecessary because the notice
alternative includes it. Receiving disclosure of a fact, after all,
is but one way of having notice of it. The former denotes the
act of another person in informing the spouse of the facts; the
latter denotes knowledge acquired by any means, whether it
be by disclosure or by the spouse's independent inquiry or ac-
cidental discovery.53
The apparent purpose of requiring disclosure or notice is
to assure a court that the spouse against whom enforcement of
the agreement is requested was well-informed when making
the agreement. Surely the only relevant criteria for sufficiency
of the notice or disclosure, then, are the kind and amount
(quality and quantity) of the information known by that
spouse (or which that spouse had the opportunity to know); it
should be entirely irrelevant whether that information was ac-
quired by disclosure or by some other means.
The person making the disclosure need not be the spouse
attempting enforcement of the agreement. The statute does
not refer to the identity of the person making the disclosure.
Of course, if the one making the disclosure were someone act-
ing under the control and direction of the spouse seeking en-
forcement, it would be rational to charge that spouse with the
acts of an agent for this purpose. But it need not be the case
that the discloser is the agent of this spouse; that person could
be anyone with access to the information who disclosed it to
the opponent spouse.54
Assuming thaf disclosure in the statute is interpreted to
refer only to an act by the spouse seeking enforcement, it is
51. See supra note 47 regarding the use of "and."
52. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58 (6)(c)(3)).
53. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.01(13)(defining "notice")).
54. It is unlikely that someone other than the spouse seeking enforcement or an
agent would have access to all the information that must be disclosed. However, the
statute does not require that one person be the sole source of all the information.
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not clear whether the "fair and reasonable" criteria are appro-
priate. If the purpose of requiring disclosure or notice of a
spouse's property and financial obligations is to uphold agree-
ments only between well-informed spouses, then the only as-
pects of disclosure that should be relevant are the quantity
and quality of the facts disclosed, not the manner of disclo-
sure. Any supposed impropriety in the manner of disclosure
that did not affect the knowledge of the other spouse should
be irrelevant to a decision regarding enforcement. If the im-
propriety of a spouse's actions in procuring the agreement is
extreme, other parts of the Act afford a remedy. 5
With respect to major deficiencies in the manner of disclo-
sure, the criteria of fairness and reasonableness are unneces-
sary: a disclosure which is egregiously unfair or unreasonable
would not be disclosure at all. If, for example, the spouse
seeking enforcement disclosed facts in an incomprehensible
form, did not afford the other spouse adequate time to inspect
them, or stated them in a way which was somehow mislead-
ing, a court should have little difficulty in holding that the
spouse's action did not constitute disclosure. 56 On the other
hand, deficiencies of disclosure that are not so extreme would
be better prevented by criteria that speak more directly to the
kind and amount of facts disclosed than to the criteria of fair-
ness and reasonableness.5 7
There is a second policy in addition to promoting sufficient
disclosure: the statute should forgive inconsequential deficien-
cies of disclosure or of notice. Indeed, that seems to be the
main effect of the criteria of fairness and reasonableness.
They make the standard for disclosure less strict than that for
notice. If the words "fair and reasonable" were absent, the
55. See, e.g., 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT §§ 766.15
(good-faith requirement), 766.58(6)(a) (conscionability requirement), 766.58(6)(b) (vol-
untariness requirement)).
56. Similarly, a major omission or inaccuracy would disqualify the spouse's actions
from being a disclosure.
57. Furthermore, to the extent that the "fair and reasonable" criterion does have
the effect of rejecting disclosure that is deficient because of its manner or content, this
criterion should apply to noticed facts as well. Facts about the other spouse's financial
condition are just as likely to be incomprehensible, incomplete, or misleading if indepen-
dently acquired by the spouse against whom enforcement is sought as they would be if
they were disclosed to that spouse. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, §47 (to be codified at Wis.
STAT. § 766.01(13)(defining "notice")).
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provision would literally require disclosure of every item of
property and every obligation. To say that disclosure must be
fair and reasonable is to forgive minor deficiencies of disclo-
sure that could not have caused the spouse to sign an other-
wise unacceptable agreement. Given this interpretation, the
fair and reasonable criteria are a useful limitation on the dis-
closure required. Again, however, their purpose would be bet-
ter served by criteria which more clearly describe the quality
and quantity of the facts known.5 8
2. Waiver
The other alternative to disclosure under the Act is waiver
of the right to disclosure. 9 Paraphrased in an affirmative
form, this provision states that the disclosure requirement will
be met if the spouse against whom enforcement is sought vol-
untarily and expressly waived in a written consent 60 any right
to disclosure of the other spouse's property and 61 financial ob-
ligations beyond that actually provided but 62 did not waive the
right to disclosure of the general categories of the other
spouse's assets at approximate fair market value less general
categories of the other spouse's liabilities at approximate fair
market value.63
What is the difference between the impermissible waiver
and the permissible waiver of disclosure? Certainly there can-
not be any significant difference in meaning between "prop-
erty" and "assets"; if the legislature intended such a
difference, it should make its intention known more explicitly
through the use of definitional sections. In addition, a permis-
58. Given the fact that the meaning of "notice" subsumes that of "disclosure," the
two alternatives should be written as one notice alternative. The following language is
suggested as a substitute paragraph 1 (with paragraph 3 omitted to 1983 Wis. Laws 186,
§ 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(c))): ". Did not have notice of facts
which constituted a reasonably accurate and complete description of the other spouse's
property and financial obligations."
59. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(c)(2)).
60. "Written consent" is defined in 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at
Wis. STAT. § 766.01(16)) as "a document signed by a person against whose interests it
is sought to be enforced."
61. See supra note 47 regarding the use of "and."
62. When the provision is converted to its affirmative form, the "or" in the statute
must be changed to an "and"; the logically equivalent "but" is used here as better re-
flecting the sense of the provision.
63. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(c)).
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sible waiver has to do with a spouse's "financial obligations";
an impermissible one concerns a spouse's "liabilities." The
term "liabilities" is probably the broader one. For example, a
spouse's duty to specifically perform as seller under a sales
contract would be a liability but perhaps not a "financial obli-
gation." The purpose of such a distinction - if one is indeed
intended here - is not obvious; again, if a difference in mean-
ing is intended, it should be made clearer.
Assuming there is little, if any, difference between "prop-
erty" and "assets," and likewise little if any difference between
"financial obligations" and "liabilities," one would find it a
difficult task to draft an instrument which contains a permissi-
ble waiver without, at the same time, containing an impermis-
sible one. A simple, unqualified waiver' has the effect of
waiving the right to disclosure of all the other spouse's prop-
erty and obligations; such a waiver necessarily includes a
waiver of the "general categories." One way to avoid waiving
disclosure of general categories would be to waive disclosure
of property and obligations which are specifically set forth in
the waiver. However, such a waiver would be a disclosure
which would meet, or come close to meeting, the requirements
of the disclosure alternative in paragraph one.65
The meaning and purpose of the clause prohibiting a "gen-
eral waiver" needs to be explained. Whatever its purpose, it
could be better implemented by a provision which states the
requirements for an effective waiver instead of the attributes of
an ineffective one.
VI. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER LAW
A. Scope
The Act does not purport to state the entire body of law
governing married persons. That which the Act fails to regu-
late will be governed by the provisions of present law.66 For
example, an agreement between spouses which is not a "mari-
tal property agreement" would not be subject to the require-
ments imposed by future section 766.58, but would be subject
64. For example, "I waive my right to disclosure of my wife's property and finan-
cial obligations."
65. See supra note 37.
66. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.95).
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to the law that now exists governing agreements between
spouses or others. The Act does not, however, clearly state
which agreements are "marital property agreements" and
which agreements are not.67
The UMPA comment offers some guidance in resolving
the question of what documents are subject to the Act. It
states that "any arrangement that changes the application of
the Act should be a marital property agreement . . .[and]
should conform with Section 10. ''6s Because the Act covers so
many aspects of the relationship between spouses, however, it
will be difficult to confidently apply the language of this
comment.
The failure of the Act to give a meaningful definition of
"marital property agreement" results in serious uncertainty
about the scope of future section 766.58. The significance of
this uncertainty and its ramifications on marital agreements
under the Act must be understood by Wisconsin
practitioners. 9
67. Compare 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.01(12))
(" 'marital property agreement' means an agreement complies with § 776.58) with id.
(to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6) ("a marital property agreement. ... is not
enforceable if. ... )). Thus, the circularity of the Act's definition provides no
assistance.
68. UMPA, supra note 2, § 10 comment.
69. The uncertainty of Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58)
will be illustrated by the following examples.
The spouses can effect a reclassification of their property, from individual to marital
or vice-versa, by gift or by marital property agreement. See fdt (to be codified at Wis.
STAT. § 766.31(10)). Indeed, such an agreement would appear to change the applica-
tion of the Act and thus to meet the UMPA criterion for a marital property agreement.
However, the Act contains no provision governing the validity of an interspousal gift;
that would be controlled by other law. Suppose that a wife executed an instrument
purporting to convey, as a gift, her individual real property to herself and her husband
as their marital property. It is unlikely that the Wisconsin Legislature intended to pro-
vide that gifts between spouses after the effective date of the Act are invalid unless
memorialized in an instrument signed by both donor and donee; in the case of real
property, present law requires only the signature of the grantor. See Wis. STAT.
§ 706.02(1) (1983-84). Therefore, it must be that the instrument executed by the wife in
the example is a deed of gift and not a marital property agreement effecting a reclassifi-
cation of the spouses' property. If it were the latter, it would be invalid because it was
not signed by both spouses.
But consider an instrument (or two separate instruments) signed by both spouses in
which each spouse conveys all individual property to the "community" as the marital
property of both. Is this transaction a gift, subject only to the requirements of the
present statutes and of common law? Or is it a marital property agreement which is




1. The duty of good faith
The Act provides that "[e]ach spouse shall act in good
faith with respect to the other spouse in matters involving
marital property or other property of the other spouse. ' 70
Does a court have the authority to declare an agreement unen-
forceable on the ground that it was a breach of the duty of
good faith, even though the requirements for an enforceable
marital agreement were met?71
First, the Act does not clearly preempt the field. It sets
forth the conditions for the unenforceability of an agreement,
not the conditions for enforceability. It does not, therefore,
prevent other sections of the Act - or other sections of the
present Wisconsin code or case law - from stating additional
grounds for declaring an agreement unenforceable or from im-
posing additional requirements for enforceability. For exam-
ple, a marital property agreement which stated a contract for
the sale of real property would be unenforceable unless it com-
nature of the transaction and its coverage of all the spouses' individual property imply a
quid pro quo that is an appropriate target of the disclosure and conscionability require-
ments?
As a second example, consider a will signed by both spouses. The spouses may
make an agreement which provides for the "[d]isposition of any of either or both
spouses' property upon dissolution or death." 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified
at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(3)(c)). Might it not be said that the will "changes the applica-
tion of the Act" by preempting the provisions of the Act regarding intestate succession?
See id. §§ 59-61 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 852.01(l)(a)(l-2)). Would that not
clearly be so if the will created a testamentary trust which gave the trustee the sole right
of management and control of the spouses' property? Is it then subject to being de-
clared invalid because the disclosure and conscionability requirements were not met?
Or is the document "only" a will which need not satisfy those requirements?
The final example is the creation of an interspousal agency. The spouses are author-
ized to make an agreement with respect to "[m]anagement and control of any of either
or both spouses' property." Id. § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(3)(b)).
Must every power of attorney given by one spouse to another be signed by both spouses
and comply with the other requirements of the marital agreement provision if it empow-
ers the agent spouse who does not have the "right" of management and control to deal
with such property under the Act? See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.51).
70. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.51(1)).
71. The Act states that spouses cannot vary the duty of good faith by an agreement.
See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 766.15(1), .58(3)). The disability of a spouse to
make an agreement which varies the duty of good faith should be distinguished from a
spouse's "ability" to breach the duty of good faith in procuring the other spouse's assent




plied with the Wisconsin statute of frauds,72 which imposes a
number of requirements beyond the basic one of a writing
signed by the parties. Likewise, an agreement could not be
enforced against a spouse who lacked capacity at the time of
execution. 73 The UMPA comment supports this interpreta-
tion. That comment states: "Although the Act sets forth a
specific group of requirements for enforceability [of agree-
ments], they are not exclusive. Ordinary contract defenses not
specifically ruled out by the Act. . .remain available." 74 If
there is nothing in the enforceability provisions to prevent the
use of ordinary contract defenses, then perhaps there is like-
wise nothing to prevent the use of a defense based on the duty
of good faith.
Second, it would be possible for a spouse to be in compli-
ance with the requirements of the Act and yet be acting in bad
faith in procuring the agreement. The Act requires that an
agreement be conscionable, not that it be in good faith.75 The
two terms do not have the same meaning. A court might hold
that the procurement of an agreement constituted bad faith
although the terms were not so one-sided as to be unconscion-
able. Moreover, a spouse who makes a financial misrepresen-
tation prior to entering into an agreement would be acting in
bad faith, but if the other spouse had notice of the first
spouse's true financial condition, the requirements of the mar-
ital agreement provision would be met. 6
There is evidence from the UMPA debates that some of
the commissioners believed that the good-faith requirement
applied to the execution of marital property agreements.77 In
addition, the commissioners discussed whether it was appro-
72. WIs. STAT. § 706.02 (1983-84).
73. An example would be a spouse who is a minor.
74. UMPA, supra note 2, § 10 comment. An example of an ordinary contract de-
fense not ruled out by the Act is lack of consideration.
75. See supra note 37.
76. In this situation one still might choose to enforce the agreement, even assuming
a requirement of good faith, because the breach of that duty did not cause the execution
of the agreement.
77. In a previous draft of UMPA, the section dealing with agreements stated in
part:
(e) A marital property agreement is enforceable if the spouse against whom en-
forcement is sought voluntarily executed the agreement; and
(1) ...a fair and reasonable disclosure. . . was provided. . .; or
(2) [there was a waiver of the right to disclosure]; or
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priate to provide, as the statute then did, that an unconsciona-
ble agreement was enforceable as long as there was
disclosure.78 It was then suggested by some of the commis-
sioners that entering into an unconscionable agreement
(which nevertheless was enforceable because there was disclo-
sure) would be a violation of the duty of good faith.79 The
commissioners' comments seem to assume that the require-
ment of good faith was an additional limitation on the en-
forceability of agreements. At the time of that discussion, the
section stated that an agreement "is enforceable" if the listed
requirements were met.8 0 That construction would not liter-
ally allow the imposition of other requirements for enforce-
ability. If the section in that form was thought to allow
additional requirements for enforceability, does the present
language - which lists circumstances resulting in unenforce-
ability - lend itself to that interpretation?
On the other hand, at least two aspects of the present stat-
ute imply that the good-faith requirement is not a limitation
on the execution of marital agreements. First, the conduct de-
scribed in the Act8' is so closely related to what is meant by
"good faith" that one could fairly conclude that the marital
agreement provision was intended to supplant the general
good-faith provision8 2 with respect to agreements between
spouses. Second, to say that each spouse "shall act in good
faith" is not to say that an act taken in bad faith is void. The
Act does, however, give a spouse "a claim against the other
spouse for breach of the duty of good faith imposed by section
766.15 resulting in damage to the claimant spouse's present
(3) [there was notice of the property and obligations of the spouse seeking
enforcement]; or
(4) the agreement was not unconscionable when it was executed.
1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 100-01.
78. The following dialogue took place:
Mr. Wade: If the agreement within itself is not unconscionable, it would
stand up? There [is] no duty to disclose?
Mr. Gregory: Assuming there was no good faith breach.
Id. at 105.
79. See id. at 105-07.
80. See supra note 77.
81. See'supra note 37.
82. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.15(1)).
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undivided 50% interest in marital property. ' 83 Under the ap-
propriate circumstances it should not be difficult to prove that
an agreement resulted in such damage.
The situations in which this question might arise will be
rare. However, resolution of the ambiguity by the legislature
would save the unnecessary litigation expense required to re-
solve the question, if, and when, a plaintiff is presented.
2. Agreements concerning property division at dissolution
The enforceability of an agreement which concerns prop-
erty division upon dissolution requires special attention. The
present Wisconsin Statutes provide:
Any written agreement made by the parties before or
during the marriage concerning any arrangement for prop-
erty distribution [at dissolution]. . . shall be binding upon
the court except that no such agreement shall be binding
where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either
party. The court shall presume any such agreement to be
equitable as to both parties.8 4
The section differs from the marital agreement provision
in a number of respects. It requires agreements to be equita-
ble rather than conscionable. Presumably, equitability would
be measured at the time of property division rather than at the
time the agreement was made. In addition, there is no re-
quirement of disclosure of property and obligations at the
time the agreement was made.85
83. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.70(1)).
84. Wis. STAT. § 767.255(11) (1983-84). The statute provides in part:
Any property shown to have been acquired by either party prior to or during
the course of the marriage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance . . . shall
remain the property of such party and may not be subjected to a property divi-
sion under this section except upon a finding [of hardship].. . , and in that
event the court may divest the party of such property in a fair and equitable
manner. The court shall presume that all other property is to be divided equally
between the parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to marital
misconduct after considering:. ...
Id. A number of subsections follow, including subsection (11), quoted in the text. Ac-
cording to the structure of section Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84), subsection (11) does
not apply to the division of gifted property. The language of subsection (11) itself,
however, is broad enough to apply to a division of gifted property, and it would be an
anomalous result if it did not. The discussion in the text assumes that it does so apply.
85. But see Wis. STAT. § 767.27 (1983-84)(disclosure of assets and liabilities at the
time of the dissolution proceedings.)
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These differences result, moreover, in a fundamental in-
consistency between the division of property statute and the
marital agreement provision that was apparently overlooked
by the drafters. Clearly, an agreement between spouses which
concerned property division upon dissolution would be gov-
erned by both sections. The Act states that in a marital prop-
erty agreement the spouses may agree with respect to
disposition of the spouses' property upon dissolution.8 6 How-
ever, section 767.255(11) states that an agreement "shall be
binding" unless it is inequitable.8 7 This language leaves no
room for the additional requirements imposed by the marital
agreement provision.88 An agreement which satisfies the re-
quirements of the property division statute but not those of
the marital agreement statute is "binding" under the former,
but is "not enforceable" under the latter. Since the require-
ments of the agreements statute are stricter than those of the
present property division statute, and since the legislature ap-
parently intended the former to apply to an agreement con-
cerning a property division at dissolution, the property
division section should be amended so it does not appear to
override the marital agreement section.89
VII. CONCLUSION
The provisions of UMPA which govern interspousal
agreements represent an ambitious attempt to regulate the
manner in which spouses may transact with each other. In-
deed, when the Wisconsin version of UMPA becomes effec-
tive, interspousal transactions in this state will be governed by
a set of statutory rules which are more detailed than those of
any other state. Because of the size and complexity of the task
which the drafters of UMPA and the Wisconsin legislators set
for themselves, it is not surprising that the product of their
86. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(3)(c)).
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 37 for a list of the requirements.
89. Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1983-84) authorizes a court to order the payment of
maintenance "after considering:... (8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties
before or during the marriage. Unlike the language of Wis. STAT. § 767.255(11)
(1983-84), this language is compatible with the imposition of additional requirements
for enforceability in 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 766.58(6)).
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efforts requires, in some of its provisions, clarification and per-
haps correction. Perhaps, after a few years, Wisconsin's expe-
rience with its version of UMPA will suggest improvements to
the Act which can be incorporated into a second draft and
which will inure to the benefit of other adopting states.
